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CIVIL REMEDIES FOR 
THERAPIST-PATIENT SEXUAL 
EXPLOIT ATION 
Laurie A. Morini 
"In every house where I come, I will enter only for the good of 
my patients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill-doing 
and all seduction, and especially from the pleasures of love with 
women and men." HIPPOCRATES, Physician's Oath 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
Since ancient times, society has recognized that physicians, 
to whom we entrust our physic'al and emotional health, must be 
held to a high standard of conduct. Sexual relationships between 
physicians and their patients have been considered forbidden 
since at least the 5th century, B.C., when Hippocrates authored 
the sacred oath by which all physicians are bound even to this 
day.2 
In more recent times, Sigmund Freud, the father of modern 
psychiatry, taught his followers that once sexual contact be-
tween therapist and patient begins, the therapeutic relationship 
is destroyed. Freud believed that no kind of erotic contact -
not even an "innocent" kiss - should be initiated in the thera-
peutic relationship. because it might confuse the patient and 
1. M.P.A., Northeastern University, 1980; J.D., Northeastern University School of 
Law, 1983; currently Executive Director, Tobacco Products Liability Project, Northeast-
ern University School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts. Any expertise which I have ac-
quired in this area, lowe to my former colleagues and clients at the Boston law firm of 
Stahlin, Bergstresser and Cole. Thanks also to the many therapists who have generously 
shared their expertise in this area with me, especially Gary R. Schoener, Licensed Psy 
chologist and Executive Director of the Minneapolis Walk-In Counseling Center and Es-
telle Disch, a feminist therapist and Certified Clinical Sociologist who leads workshops 
for survivors of therapist sexual abuse at Tapestry, Inc. in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
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lead to the "danger" of further erotic intimacy.s Freud's con-
cerns appear to have been validated by a recent study of the 
characteristics of "erotic" practicioners, which concluded that a 
physician's attitudes and practices regarding nonerotic behavior 
with patients (e.g. hugging, kissing and affectionate touching) 
may help to predict those who would also engage in erotic (e.g. 
sexual) behavior.' 
3. In a letter written by Freud to a colleague in 1931, he says: 
... You have not made a secret of the fact that you kiss your 
patients and let them kiss you; ... 
Now I am assuredly not one of those who from prudishness or 
from consideration of bourgeois convention would condemn 
little erotic gratifications of this kind .... But that does not 
alter the facts ... that with us a kiss signifies a certain erotic 
intimacy. We have hither~ in our technique held to the con-
clusion that patients are to be refused erotic gratifications. 
You know too that where more extensive gratifications are not 
to be had milder caresses very easily take over their role, in 
love affairs, on the stage, etc. 
Now picture what will be the result of publishing your tech-
nique. There is no revolutionary who is not driven out of the 
field by a still more radical one. A number of independent 
thinkers in matters of technique will say to themselves: why 
stop at a kiss? Certainly one gets further when one adopts 
'pawing' as well, which after all doesn't make a baby. And 
then bolder ones will come along who will go further to peep-
ing and showing - and soon we shall have accepted in the 
technique of analysis the whole repertoire of demiviergerie 
and petting parties, resulting in an enormous increase of inter-
est in psychoanalysis among both analysts and patients. The 
new adherents, however, will easily claim too much of this in-
terest for himself, the younger of our colleagues will find it 
hard to stop at the point they originally intended, and God 
the Father Ferenczi gazing at the lively scene he has created 
will perhaps say to himself: may be after all I should have 
halted in my technique of motherly affection before the kiss. 
Sentences like 'about the dangers of neocatharsis' don't get 
very far. One should obviously not let oneself get into the dan-
ger. I have purposely not mentioned the increase of calumni-
ous resistances. against analysis the kiSsing technique would 
bring, although it seems to me a wanton act to provoke them. 
3 JONES, THE LIFE AND WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD 163 (1953), 
cited in Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 895, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 
587, 590 (Sup.Ct. 1976)(Markowitz, P.J., concurring). 
See also, K. POPE &. J. BOUTOUTSOS, SEXUAL INTIMACY BE-
TWEEN THERAPISTS AND PATIENTS 29-30, (Praeger Medical Se-
ries No.5, 1986)[hereinafter cited as POPE & BOUHOUTSOS). 
4. Kardener, Fuller and Mensch, Characteristics of "Erotic" Practicioners, 133:11 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1324 (1976). The study concluded: "It would appear that the freer a 
physician is with nonerotic contact, the more statistically likely he is to also engage in 
erotic practices with his patient." Id. at 1325. Erotic practices are not limited to sexual 
2
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Despite these admonitions, research conducted by a number 
of researchers since the early 1970's has revealed that a substan-
tial number of therapists have had erotic contact with their pa-
tients. 1I For example, in a recent nation-wide survey of psychia-
trists, more than 6% of the respondents ~dmitted that they had 
engaged in sexual contact with patients.s Another study found 
that 10.9% of male and 1.9% of female psychologists have had 
some kind of erotic contact with their patients.' Civil actions in-
volving sexual intimacies account for about 45% of the total 
paid out over the last ten years by the American Psychological 
Association's professional liability coverage provider.8 
Because the reported instances of therapist-patient sexual 
contact overwhelmingly involve male therapists with'female pa-
tients,9 one recent analysis compared the problem with other 
intercourse; they may also include kissing, fondling, nude swimming and other sexual 
activities. Plaut & Foster, Roles of the Health Professional in Cases Involving Sexual 
Exploitation of Patients. SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS BY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
5, 7-10 (Praeger Medical Series No.4, 1986). Other kinds of boundary violations (e.g. 
dating, taking vacations together, or otherwise getting too involved in a patient's per-
sonal life) may also constitute malpractice, Id., but are beyond the scope of this article. 
5. See, e.g., Kardener, Fuller and Mensch, A Survey of Physicians' Attitudes and 
Practices Regarding Erotic and Nonerotic Contact with Patients, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1077 (1973)[hereinafter cited as Kardener); Holroyd and Brodsky, Psychologists' Atti-
tudes and Practices Regarding Erotic and Nonerotic Physical Contact with Patients, 
32:10 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 843 (1977)[hereinafter cited as Holroyd); Bouhoutsos, Holroyd, 
Lerman, Forer and Greenberg, Sexual Intimacy Between Psychotherapists and Pa-
tients, 14:2 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND' PRACTICE 185 (1983)[hereinafter cited as 
Bouhoutsos); Gartrell, Herman, Olarte, Feldstein and Localio, Psychiatrist-Patient Sex-
ual Contact: Results of a National Survey, I: Prevalence, 143:9 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1126 
(1986)[hereinafter cited as Gartrell). 
6. Gartrell, supra note 5 at 1128. "Sexual contact" in this study was defined as 
"contact which was intended to arouse or satisfy sexual desire in the patient, therapist, 
or both." [d. at 1127. 74"lo of the instances reported included genital contact; in the 
remaining cases the sexual contact consisted of kissing, fondling, and/or undressing. [d. 
at 1128. . 
7. Holroyd, supra note 5 at 846-847. The study also found that 5.5"lo of male and 
0.6"lo of female licensed Ph.D. psychologists surveyed admitted to sexual intercourse 
with patients. Id. Since all the cited figures are based entirely on therapist self-report, 
they can safely be assumed to represellt minimal estimates of incidence. Gartrell, supra 
note 5 at 1129; Schoener, Milgrom and Gonsiorek, Sexual Exploitation of Clients by 
Therapists, WOMEN AND MENTAL HEALTH 64 (1984). 
8. Ethics Committee of the American Psychological Association, Trends in Ethics 
Cases, Common Pitfalls, and Published Resources, 43:7 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 564, 
567 (July 1988)[hereinafter cited as Trends in Ethics Cases). 
9. See, e.g., Gartrell, supra note 5 at 1126 (88"lo of the sexual contacts occurred 
between male psychiatrists and female patients). See also the statistics cited at notes 6-
8, supra. Based upon these statistics, this article will \lse male pronouns to refer to ther-
apists and female pronouns to refer to patients. However, the author wishes to acknowl-
3
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kinds of harm done to women, such as marital abuse and sexual 
harrassment in the workplace. Io The commentator argues that 
sexual exploitation of women patients by their therapists occurs 
because women in general are conditioned to accept subordinate 
social roles. The psychiatric community as a whole values such 
subordinate behavior in women, and thus has been slow to ac-
knowledge the problem of sexual exploitation.ll 
Irrespective of the gender issue, one of the most disturbing 
revelations of these studies is the pattern of repeat offenses and 
the attitudes underlying them.12 The overwhelming majority of 
therapists believe that sexual contact between patient and ther-
apist is always inappropriate during the course of treatment. IS 
By' contrast, psychiatrists who acknowledge having had sexual 
contact with one or more patients in a recent survey differed 
markedly from their peers in their attitudes. H The offenders 
were much more likely to allow for exceptions to the general 
rule;III for example, they were more likely to believe that sexual 
edge that sexual exploitation may be just as damaging where the genders of the parties 
are reversed or when the therapist and patient share the same gender. 
10. LeBoeuf, Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women Patients, 11 
HARVARD WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL 83, 85 (1988)[hereinafter cited as LeBoeuf]. 
11. [d. at 84-85. Much of the clinical literature supports this view, underlining the 
culpability of society and of most psychotherapists for perpetuating a stereotype of femi-
ninity which often leads to abuse. See, e.g., Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 49-51; 
Holroyd, supra note 5 at 843. 
12. Holroyd, supra note 5 at 847, reported that 80% of the psychologists who admit-
ted to sexual intercourse had done so with more than one client. Gartrell's study indi-
cated that 33.3% of the offenders had been involved with more than one patient, with 
one psychiatrist reporting involvement with as many as twelve patients. Gartrell, supra 
note 5 at 1128. 
13. Herman, Gartrell, Oiarte, Feldstein and Localio, Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual 
Contacts: Results of a National Suruey, II: Psychiatrists' Attitudes, 144:1 AM. J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 164, 165 (1987)[hereinafter cited as Herman). 98% of the respondents believed that 
sexual contact between patient and therapist is always inappropriate during therapy ses-
sions or concurrent with treatment, and 97.4% believed that such contact is usually or 
always harmful to the patient. "Although 'always harmful' was not offered as a forced-
choice option on this question, it was written in by 13% of the respondents. Many com-
mented spontaneously that they considered such behavior equivalent to rape." [d. at 
165. 
14. [d. at 166-167. 
15. [d. The most widely reported exception was for sexual relations after termina-
tion of therapy. 74% of the offenders believed that sexual relations could be appropriate 
after termination; only 27.4% of the nonoffenders thought so. [d. at 166. The survey 
indicated that there is a wide range of opinion and considerable confusion among ther-
apists on the matter of sexual relationships after termination. [d. at 167-169. See also, 
infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
4
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contact could be appropriate if the therapist "fell in love" with 
the patient,16 and a considerable minority believed that sexual 
relations could sometimes be appropriate as a form of therapy.17 
Repeat offenders (who comprised approximately one-third of the 
offenders who responded) were particularly likely to believe m 
the therapeutic value of sexual relations with patients.18 
Just as troubling was the offenders' apparent lack of percep-
tion of the harm invariably caused by their conduct, and their 
overwhelming lack of regret for the consequences to the patient. 
Most offenders who responded to the survey believed that their 
relationships with patients were at best "mutually satisfying," 
and at worst "innocuous."19 Only 9.5% recognized that their pa-
tients experienced the sexual relationship as harmful,20 and only 
one offender who answered the survey expressed regret based on 
an understanding of the meaning of the sexual contact to the 
patient.21 For the most part, the respondents who expressed re-
grets were concerned about the consequences of the relationship 
to their own personal and career goals.22 
16. Herman, supra note 13. 21.4% of the offenders as opposed to 3.5% of the non-
offenders. [d. at 166. 
17. [d. Nearly 10% of the offenders thought that sexual relations could sometimes 
be appropriate as a therapeutic intervention during treatment sessions, whereas only 1 % 
of the nonoffenders thought so. Moreover, 19% of the offenders said that sexual contact 
could sometimes to beneficial to patients, compared with 1 % of the nonoffenders. [d. at 
166. 
18. [d. "The majority of the offenders who condoned sexual relations within the 
treatment setting or concurrent with treatment - and who accepted such therapeutic in-
dications as enhancing a patient's self-esteem, providing a corrective emotional experi-
ence, or changing a patient's sexual orientation - were also repeaters." [d. at 167. 
19. [d. For example, a 55-year old man, in practice for 24 years, who had sexual 
contact with three female patients, characterized his most recent relationship as "a lov-
ing relation to a healthy human being I'd come to know," and said that it "in no way had 
the usual sordid tinge." Another male therapist who had sexual relations with two male 
former patients wrote that he learned from the experience and no harm was done that he 
could see, although former patients were now off his list of prospective sexual partners. 
[d. at 167. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. This man, who had become involved with a patient during his psychiatry 
clerkship as a medical student, saw the involvement as having "no therapeutic intent, 
simply a loss of impulse control on my part, not in love but in lust." He later felt great 
remorse at his patient's disappointment in him, but was too ashamed to seek consulta-
tion. [d. at 167. 
22. [d. at 167. For example, a 30-year old man who became sexually involved with a 
patient during residency wrote that he had been devastated by the experience, and 
couldn't believe the risks he had taken with his marriage and his career. He was not so 
certain about the effect of his sexual relationship on his patient, since "[hler life was 
5
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This callous disregard flies in the face of what is known 
about the devastating consequences to most patients who engage 
in sexual relationships with their therapists.23 Depression and 
low self-esteem, two of the most common problems which lead 
women to seek therapy, are typically exacerbated by such a rela-
tionship.24 In addition, sexual involvement with a therapist adds 
to the patient's confusion and can lead to marked ambivalence 
and extreme mood swings as feelings come into conflict.211 These 
symptoms can lead to suicidal feelings or behavior, increased 
drug or alcohol use, and in extreme cases to hospitalization and/ 
or suicide.26 
When the relationship ends, patients generally suffer a con-
fusIng range of emotions. Many feel guilty about the relationship 
and blame themselves for what happened.27 They may alternate 
between grief at the loss and anger at the abuse of trust.28 Some 
patients are afraid to tell their families or friends, so they be-
come increasingly depressed and isolated. 29 If they do tell, they 
terribly chaotic to begin with, with multiple moves, suicide attempts, substance abuse, 
etc." [d. at 167. 
23. Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 57-68. "The usual clinical picture includes a 
loss of trust, poor self-concept, problems with expression of anger, loss of confidence in 
the patient's own judgment, feelings of guilt, ambivalence about the damaging relation-
ship, and difficulty in establishing a relationship in any subsequent therapy." [d. at 64. 
For two first-hand accounts of the devastating consequences which these relationships 
have on their victims, see, E. Plaisil, THERAPIST (1985) and L. Freeman & J. Roy, BE-
TRAYAL (1976)[hereinafter cited as J. Roy]("The true story of the first woman to success-
fully sue her psychiatrist for using sex in the guise of therapy.") 
24. Schoener, supra note 7 at 65. The authors work at the Minneapolis Walk-In 
Counseling Center (WICC), a pioneer in providing short-term counseling and advocacy 
services to victims of sexual exploitation by therapists since 1974. [d. at 63. 
25. [d. 
26. Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 61. Many clinicians believe that the seque-
lae of therapist-patient sexual involvement form a distinct clinical syndrome with both 
acute and chronic phases, identified by some clinicians as post-traumatic stress disorder . 
. [d. at 63-64. One study showed that 90% of the patients had adverse effects. [d. at 61. 
They were more despondent, less motivated, had impaired social adjustment, and were 
significantly more emotionally disturbed. There was an increase in drug or alcohol use, 
suicidal behavior and hospitalization, as well as a worsening of sexual, mental or intimate 
relationships, mistrust of the opposite sex and sexual impairment. In addition, they 
never received therapy for their original problems once the sexual relationship started. 
[d. Many victims who are seriously traumatized spend a lifetime undoing the damage. 
[d. 
27. Schoener, supra note 7 at 64. 
28. [d. at 64-65. 
29. [d. 
6
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may not be believed, or may be blamed for what happened. so 
Whether they tell or not, the problems caused by the sexual re-
lationship can have devastating consequences for their spouses 
and children, the unseen secondary victims of the therapist's 
abuse of trust. 31 
Perhaps the most universal symptom of therapist-patient 
sexual relationships is a massive loss of trust in the therapist, in 
the profession, and often in the fairness of life itself.32 This loss 
of trust makes it difficult for the patient to ever get help for the 
problems which first brought her to therapy, or to resolve the 
problems caused by her relationship with the therapist.3s Even if 
a patient knows she needs help, she may not know where to 
turn, and may be afraid that her confidentiality .will not be 
maintained.34 These factors make it difficult, if not impossible, 
for some patients to seek assistance in getting redress until 
many years after the injury has occurred. 311 
30. Id. at 66. 
31. Schoener & Milgrom, A Walk-In Counseling Center Approach to Therapist 
Sexual Misconduct, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS BY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 152, 
156-157 (Praeger Medical Series No.4, 1986). The authors report that sexual contact 
with a therapist tends to accelerate marital break-ups in shaky marriages, and children 
often suffer from the emotional unavailability of one or both parents. Employers may 
also be affected by temporarily reduced work performance on the part of the victim or 
her family members. Id. at 156-157. 
32. See, e.g., Sonne, Meyer, Borys and Marshall, Clients' Reactions to Sexual Inti-
macy in Therapy, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 183-186 (April 1985). In their experience 
with a post-therapy support group at the UCLA Psychology Clinic, the authors report 
that the effects of the therapists' betrayal seem to generalize into a more global lack of 
trust. The victims seem to have lost their view of the world as a fair and just place in 
which individuals and institutions could be counted on. "They expressed disgust with 
psychotherapy licensing boards, training institutions, and the professions. Similarly, 
most women felt ambivalent toward the legal system, pointing to the unfair treatment 
received by rape and incest victims." Id. at 185. See also, Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra 
note 2 at 65. 
33. See, e.g., Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 63-65; Apfel and Simon, Sexual-
ized Therapy: Causes and Consequences, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS BY 
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 143, 146-147 (Praeger Medical Series No.5, 1986). 
34. See Schoener, supra note 7 at 66. 
35. See Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 130. "Frequently patients are so dam-
aged by their sexual involvement with the therapist that they are unable to face wha~ 
has occurred to them. They may have strong ambivalence about the therapist. This feel-
ing of guilt or complicity keeps them from even considering filing a complaint or lawsuit. 
Sometimes the therapist has told them that sexual contact is part of the therapy, or has 
blamed them for his or her loss of interest, and they feel so responsible for the damage 
they have suffered that they don't realize that the therapist has the responsibility. These 
patients do not know nor can they allow themselves to consider the possibility that the 
therapist's sexual conduct is malpractice." Id. at 130. 
7
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Many therapists who specialize in this area believe that fil-
ing a complaint against the offending therapist can be an impor-
tant, positive and healing experience for patients who have been 
sexually involved with their therapists.36 For those patients who 
eventually seek redress against the therapist, there are a number 
of avenues available. s7 However, civil litigation is the only rem-
edy which can provide money damages to compensate the pa-
tient for her pain and suffering, and pay the costs of extensive 
therapy which is often needed to undo the damage done by the 
illicit relationship. 
This article explores the clinical and legal issues raised in 
civil actions brought by patients against their therapists for sex-
36. See, e.g., Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 110. 
37. Many therapists belong to professional societies which have formal complaint 
procedures. See note 47, infra. Although these organizations do not have authority to 
revoke a therapist's license, they may expel or suspend him, notify other members of 
what happened, or require the therapist to get supervision or training to retain his mem-
bership. These measures might limit the therapist's career opportunities and patient re-
ferrals, and prevent him from perpetuating the abuse. See, e.g., Pope & Bouhoutsos, 
supra note 2 at 115-l16. 
If the therapist is licensed, a complaint filed with the appropriate licensing agency 
could result in suspension or revocation of the therapist's license. [All 50 states license 
psychiatrists and psychologists, more than half license social workers, and some license 
other professionals as well.] Although a suspension or revocation means that the thera-
pist can no longer hold himself out as a member of his profession, in most states he could 
continue to offer services as an unlicensed counselor. See, e.g., Pope & Bouhoutsos, 
supra note 2 at 117-118. See also, FLA. STAT. ANN., §490.Q12, 490.014 (West 1988)("No 
provision of this chapter [licensing psychologists] shall be construed to limit the practice 
of medicine, osteopathy, nursing, clinical social work, marriage and family therapy, 
mental health counseling, or other recognized businesses or to prevent qualified members 
of other professions from doing work consistent with their training, so long as they do 
not hold themselves out to the public as possessing a license .. "). 
Minnesota has enacted a registration statute designed to deal with the problem of 
unlicensed practicioners, which requires all "mental health service providers" (a broad 
term which encompasses any type of assessment, treatment or counseling) to register 
with a board which can take disciplinary action (including revocation of the right to 
practice) if they engage in sexual contact with a patient or former patient or other speci-
fied forms of misconduct. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148B.40 et seq. (West 1989). 
In addition, some states have enacted specific criminal statutes which make thera-
pist patient sexual contact during the course of treatment a felony or misdemeanor. See, 
e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. ]940.22 (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.344-609.345 (West 
1989); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. ]]750.90 (West 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. §490.01l1-490.012 
(West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §18-3-405.5 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §632-A:1 et seq. 
(1986). 
Finally, a victim of therapist sexual exploitation may file a common law action 
against the offending therapist for malpractice, intentional tort, or breach of contract, 
see discussion at Section IIA of text, and in some states may have a statutory civil cause 
of action against the therapist, see note 48, infra. 
8
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ual exploitation.38 Section II provides an overview of the various 
substantive theories of liability and defenses, as well as special 
procedural difficulties and problems of proof in sexual abuse 
cases.39 It suggests that the "consent" defense is an inappropri-
ate analytical framework in a malpractice action based upon 
therapist sexual exploitation. The real dispute should center 
around the parameters of a therapist's duty to his patient 
outside of the formal therapeutic setting. Section III examines 
the statute of limitations problem, and suggests a statutory ap-
proach to ensure a victim's remedy is preserved until she is both 
intellectually and psychologically able to understand and seek 
redress for the injuries inflicted by the offending therapist. 
II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY, DEFENSES AND 
PROBLEMS OF PROOF 
A. MISHANDLING OF THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIP AS 
MALPRACTICE 
In 1968, Ada Margaret Zipkin was awarded $17,000 for inju-
ries resulting from her psychiatrist's mishandling of the thera-
peutic relationship!O Several years later, in a highly publicized 
38. For purposes of this article, "therapist-patient sexual exploitation" includes any 
erotic contact between a therapist and patient which results from the therapist's mishan-
dling of the therapeutic process. "Therapist" includes psychiatrists, psychologists, mar-
riage and family counselors, ministers, and other licensed and unlicensed professionals 
who hold themselves out as competent to render advice and treatment for emotional 
and/or psychological problems. Despite the confusion among clinicians, see note 15, 
supra, this article assumes that the therapist's duty to the patient may continue beyond 
the termination of formal therapy sessions, and that in some circumstances it may con-
stitute malpractice for a therapist to engage in a sexual relationship with a former pa-
tient. See discussion at Section IIC of text and notes 69-73, infra. 
39. This section does not attempt to duplicate the work of other commentators who 
have reviewed the substantive law of sexual exploitation. See LeBoeuf, supra note 9. 
Instead, using the seminal case of Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587 
(Sup. Ct. 1976), as the primary illustration, this section analyzes some of the conceptual 
and practical problems encountered in pursuing a civil claim for damages based upon a 
therapist's sexual exploitation of his patient. 
40. Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W. 2d 753 (Mo. 1968). This case did not specifically 
turn on allegations of sexual contact, although a sexual relationship was at least implied 
by the testimony, which included allegations of nude swimming parties. Dr. Freeman's 
misconduct consisted of misusing the therapeutic relationship to induce the plaintiff to 
attend social events with him, leave her husband and move into a farm owned by him, 
and steal property from her husband, among other things. Mrs. Zipkin testified that she 
fell in love with Dr. Freeman, put her faith and trust in him, and did or said anything he 
told her was good for her. Expert testimony was introduced that Dr. Freeman's "treat-
ment" of the plaintiff was a distortion of the transference phenomenon which caused the 
9
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case, Julie Roy became the first woman in the United States to 
successfully sue her psychiatrist for engaging in sex with her as a 
form of therapy.41 These ground-breaking cases established that 
mishandling of the therapeutic relationship - especially by en-
gaging in a sexual relationship with a patient -is a basis for a 
claim of malpractice or gross negligence. Courts across the coun-
plaintiff serious (and perhaps permanent) emotional harm. Id. at 759-760. 
Prior to the Zipkin case, most of the handful of reported cases had been brought by 
husbands who suffered damages as a result of their wives' sexual relationship with a 
therapist. See, e.g., Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill. App. 3d 140, 474 N.E. 2d 13 (1985)(husband 
sued social worker who had been the couple's marriage counselor and had engaged in 
sexual relations with the wife); Anclote Manor Foundation v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1972)(husband recovered damages for hospital costs of his ex-wife where 
hospital psychiatrist had told the patient he was going to divorce his wife and marry 
her). 
In many jurisdictions, these types of cases were prohibited by "heart-balm" statutes, 
which barred civil liability for alienation of affections, seduction and criminal conversa-
tion. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W. 2d 313 (1968)(husband's 
suit for breach of contract, malpractice, assault and battery and fraud against marital 
counselor who engaged in sexual relations with his wife was in substance an action for 
alienation of affections barred by statute). See also, A. Stone, Sexual Exploitation of 
Patients in Psychotherapy, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY & MORALITY 191, 197 (1984). Although 
some defendants have argued that the heart-balm statutes also bar any action by the 
spouse who engaged in the sexual relationship, most courts have rejected that argument. 
See, e.g., Cotton v. Kambly, 101 Mich. App. 537, 300 N.W. 2d 627 (1980); Roy v. 
Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 897, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 592 (Sup.Ct. 1976)(Riccobano, J., 
dissenting). 
41. Roy v. Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587, 85 Misc. 2d 891 (Sup.Ct. 1976). [The facts in 
this note and notes 50-52, infra, are drawn largely from the plaintiff's own account, see J. 
Roy, supra note 23.) Julie Roy was thirty years old in 1969 when she entered therapy 
with Dr. Renatus Hartogs, seeking help for a serious depression following her divorce. 
Shortly after she began therapy, Dr. Hartogs began asking Ms. Roy to have sex with him, 
telling her that it would cure her fear of men and alleged "homosexuality." (She had 
engaged in a short-lived relationship with another woman following her divorce.) Slowly, 
Dr. Hartogs drew Ms. Roy into a sexual relationship with him, encouraging her to con-
tinue by telling her that she was making progress in her therapy. In general, their ses-
sions lasted only about ten minutes, including the sex. When Ms. Roy tried to talk to Dr. 
Hartogs about her problems or the fact that she was still feeling depressed, he would tell 
her it wasn't important. After about a year and a half, prompted by Ms. Roy's increasing 
demands for more time with him, Dr. Hartogs abruptly terminated the relationship and 
refused to see her for therapy any longer. J. Roy, supra note 23, ch. 3-4. 
During the following year, Ms. Roy was so distraught that she quit her job, refused 
to talk to anyone, and had to be hospitalized twice to prevent suicide. She only turned to 
the legal system for help when she finally realized that there was no other way to avenge 
herself for the harm that had been done to her by Dr. Hartogs. Despite the assistance of 
extremely competent counsel who believed in her case and did their best to protect her, 
Ms. Roy's experience with the legal system illustrates some of the problems commonly 
faced by victims of sexual exploitation who decide to seek legal redress for their injuries; 
i.e., lengthy delays, grueling discovery, "blaming the victim," and difficulties in collecting 
any damages that are awarded. See, infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
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try have uniformly accepted this analysis,'u often adopting the 
clinical explanation that sexual relationships with clients consti-
tute a mishandling of the "transference phenomenon".43 The 
"transference" explanation is only one of many plausible theo-
ries for a claim of malpractice. In most jurisdictions, all that is 
required to establish malpractice is expert testimony that the 
therapist's conduct was a departure from standard and accepted 
practice and that this conduct caused the patient harm.44 This 
legal framework leaves room for plaintiffs' experts to offer alter-
native explanations for the malpractice; for example, abuse of 
the power. imbalance which is inherent in the therapeutic rela-
42. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986); Vigilant In-
surance Co. v. Employers Insurance Wausau, 626 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Aetna 
Life & Casualty Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Waters v. Bourhis, 40 
Cal. 3d 424, 709 P.2d 469, 220 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1985); Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill. App. 3d 140, 
474 N.E. 2d 13 (1985); L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 122 Wis. 2d 455, 362 N.W.2d 174 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 122 Wis. 2d 783, 367 N.W.2d 223 (1985); St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Mitchell, 164 Ga. App. 215, 296 S.E.2d 126 (1982); Cot-
ton v. Kambly, 101 Mich. App. 537, 300 N.W. 2d 627 (1980); Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 
891, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587 (Sup.Ct. 1976); Seymour v. Lofgreen, 209 Kan. 72, 495 P.2d 969 
(1972); Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968). 
43. "Transference" is a psychological term used to describe a patient's projection of 
her feelings regarding a significant other (typically a parent) onto the therapist. See, e.g., 
Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986). 
Transference is the term used by psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists to denote a patient's emotional reaction to a therapist 
and is 'generally applied to the projection of feelings, thoughts 
and wishes onto the analyst, who has come to represent some 
person from the patient's past ... .' Transference is crucial to 
the therapeutic process because the patient 'unconsciously at-
tributes to the psychiatrist or analyst those feelings which he 
may have repressed towards his own parents. . . . [I)t is 
through the creation, experiencing and resolution of these feel-
ings that [the patient) becomes well.' ... The proper thera-
peutic response is countertransference, a reaction which avoids 
emotional involvement and assists the patient in overcoming 
problems ... 
When the therapist mishandles transference and becomes sex-
ually involved with a patient, medical authorities are nearly 
unanimous in considering such conduct to be malpractice. Id. 
at 1364-1365. 
Once they have concluded that there is malpractice, most courts have had little diffi-
culty recognizing that "by introducing sexual activity into the relationship, the therapist 
runs the risk of causing additional psychological damage to the patient." L.L. v. Medical 
Protective Co., 122 Wisc. 2d ~55, 462, 362 N.W. 2d 174, 178 (1984). 
44 .. See, e.g. Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 893, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587, 588 (S.Ct. 
1976)(allegations that harm was caused to plaintiff by defendant's failure to treat with 
professionally acceptable procedures stated a viable cause of action for malpractice). 
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tionship even if transference has not taken place.4I! 
Such expert testimony should not be difficult to obtain, 
since the vast majority of respected mental health professionals 
believe it is an abuse of trust for a therapist to have sexual rela-
tions with a patient.46 In fact, in response to concerns raised by 
recent studies of the prevalence of therapist-patient sexual con-
tact, the ethics codes of the major mental health associations 
have been revised to clearly prohibit therapist patient sexual 
contact.47 Some state legislatures, in recognition of the problem, 
45. The duty not to abuse this power imbalance has been described by numerous 
clinical commentators, who see it as the core of the therapeutic contract. See, e.g., Her-
man, supra note 13 at 168: 
Patients enter therapy in need of help and care. By virtue of 
this fact, they voluntarily submit themselves to an unequal re-
lationship in which their therapists have superior knowledge 
and power. Transference feelings related to the universal 
childhood experience of dependence on a parent are inevitably 
aroused. These feelings further exaggerate the power imbal-
ance in the therapeutic relationship and render all patients 
vulnerable to exploitation. The promise to abstain from abus-
ing this position of power for personal gratification is central 
to the therapeutic contract; violations of this promise destroy 
the basic trust on which the therapeutic process is founded. 
Id. at 168. 
Because the power dynamic created in the therapist-patient relationship resembles the 
parent-child relationship, many clinicians have compared the prohibition against sexual 
contact with patients to the incest taboo. See, Id. at 168; Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 
2 at 23. 
46. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 13 at 168. Although historically a minority of ther-
apists have advocated sexual contact with patients as a therapeutic modality, Herman 
notes that such beliefs have always been considered unorthodox and have generated 
great controversy. Id. Many commentators openly scoff at the notion that sex with a 
patient could ever be therapeutic. 
The physician's protestation that by being his patient's lover 
he is really proving he cares and is therefore offering a valua-
ble gift is best viewed as an emotional Trojan horse that con-
ceals not only his own needs but hostility and antipathy to-
ward his patients as persons and their struggle for emotional 
well-being. In responding to his patients' erotic fantasies, the 
physician can only finally prove to be a horrendous disap-
pointment when, by the dictates of his life circumstances, he 
must ultimately reassert his own realities. Kardener, Sex and 
the Physician-Patient ReLationship, 131:10 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 
1134, 1136 (October 1984). 
See also LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 91-92; Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 27, 58-60. 
47. See, Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 30-31, which quotes the following rele-
vant sections of the ethics codes: 
"The necessary intensity of the therapeutic relationship may tend to activate sexual 
and other needs and fantasies on the part of both patient and therapist, while weakening 
12
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have enacted statutes explicitly creating a civil cause of action 
for therapist-patient sexual exploitation!S 
B. THRESHHOLD CONSIDERATIONS 
Despite widespread recognition by the courts that a thera-
pist's sexual contact with a patient may constitute malpractice,"9 
the objectivity necessary for control. Sexual activity with a patient is unethical." (Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association 1985) 
"Psychologists are continually cognizant of their own needs and of their potentially 
influential position vis-a-vis persons such as clients, students and subordinates. They 
avoid exploiting the trust and dependency of such persons .... Sexual intimacies with 
clients are unethical." (American Psychological Association 1981) 
"The social worker should under no circumstances engage in sexual activities with 
clients." (National Association of Social Workers 1980) 
"Sexual relationships between analyst and patient are antithetic to treatment and 
unacceptable under any circumstance. Any sexual activity with a patient constitutes a 
violation of this principle of ethics." (American Psychoanalytic Association 1983) 
"A therapist will attempt to avoid relationships with clients which might impair pro-
fessional judgment or increase the risks of exploiting clients. Examples of such relation-
ships include: Treatment of family members, close friends, employees, or supervisees. 
Sexual activity with clients is unethical." (American Association for Marriage and Fam-
ily Therapy 1982) 
48. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.01-148A.06 (West 1989); WISC. STAT. ANN. 
§895.70 (West 1989); CAL. CIV. CODE §43.93 (West 1989). The Minnesota statute creates a 
cause of action not only against the offending therapist, MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.02, but 
also against the therapist's employer [or former employer) for failing to request [or dis-
close) information about known sexual contact by the therapist, or failure to take reason-
able action against a psychotherapist known to have engaged in sexual contact with a 
patient, MINN. STAT. ANN. §148.03. 
49. See note 42, supra. Although most of the decided cases have adopted a malprac-
tice analysis, there are several other viable causes of action available to plaintiffs, includ-
ing various intentional tort theories (e.g. assault and battery, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and fraudulent concealment) as well as breach of contract claims. See 
LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 108-110. In most circumstances, there is little to be gained 
from alleging the intentional tort theories, since proof of "intent" or "recklessness" 
places a much greater burden on plaintiffs than proof of malpractice. 
For example, proof of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires, at a mini-
mum, a showing of "recklessness", e.g. that the therapist acted "knowing or having rea-
son to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize ... that his conduct 
creates an unreasonable risk of ... harm to another [and) that such risk is substantially 
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §500 (1964). Moreover, the plaintiff must establish that the therapist's 
conduct was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 comments a and j (1964). The "outrageousness" of 
the therapist's conduct may arguably arise from his abuse of his position of authority or 
power over the plaintiff, but even this is more difficult to prove than simple negligence. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 comment e (1964). 
In the most extreme and outrageous cases of abuse, proof of an intentional tort may 
assist the plaintiff in paving the way for an award of punitive damages, which in most 
13
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plaintiffs face a number of obstacles to a successful civil action. 
First, it is common for the therapist to deny that the sexual con-
duct occurred, thus turning the case into a battle of credibility.~o 
The therapist has the advantage in this battle, not only because 
he is a trusted professional, but also because he can use his su-
perior training to brand the patient "crazy" and claim that she 
imagined or "made up" the sexual relationship.~l Because the 
plaintiff has put her emotional and sexual health in issue, the 
jurisdictions requires a finding of something akin to "recklessness". But see, Roy v. 
Hartogs, 85 Misc.2d 891, 894, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587, 589 (Sup.Ct. 1976), where the court 
overturned the jury's award of punitive damages because the weight of the evidence did 
not justify the jury's finding that the defendant's conduct was so wanton or reckless as to 
permit an award for punitive damages. 
50. See LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 97-100; Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 131. 
The Roy case aptly illustrates this problem. During discovery, although Dr. Hartogs ap-
peared for a deposition, he refused to answer any questions on the ground that he might 
incriminate himself. Then, mid-way through the trial, his attorneys indicated that he 
was planning to testify on his own behalf. During a hasty mid-trial deposition, Dr. 
Hartogs claimed that he had been unable to have sexual intercourse since 1965 because 
of a hydrocele (a gross enlargement of the testicle). J. Roy, supra note 23 at Chapters 8-
9. The judge permitted plaintiff to get a mid-trial medical evaluation of the defendant's 
condition by a prominent New York urologist, who testified that he had never heard of a 
case of impotence caused by a hydrocele, and that the draining of a hydrocele was a ten 
minute office procedure which any doctor could perform. However, defense attorneys 
used Dr. Hartogs' testimony to great advantage at trial, questioning Ms. Roy about the 
abnormality and implying that she had "made up" the sexual relationship to get even 
with Dr. Hartogs for terminating her therapy. [d. 
As Dr. Hartogs discovered, the "denial" defense can be a dangerous one for the ther-
apist. Once he testifies that he has never engaged in sexual relations with a client, the 
plaintiff may be permitted to introduce testimony from other patients who were also 
sexually involved with the therapist. See, Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc.2d 891, 893, 381 
N.Y.S. 2d 587, 588-589 (Sup.Ct. 1976)(After Dr. Hartogs testified that he was unable to 
have sexual relations with Ms. Roy because of his hydrocele, plaintiff was permitted to 
introduce witnesses who testified that he had engaged in sex with them during that same 
period of time.) [d. 
Other victims of the therapist's sexual abuse may also be permitted to testify to 
establish other relevant facts, such as motive, opportunity, intent, etc. See Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b). One plaintiffs' attorney goes so far as to place an advertisement in local papers 
seeking former patients of the defendant to compare treatment experiences. D. Burn-
stein, Sexual Malpractice Litigation, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS BY HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS 49, 57 (Praeger Medical Series No.4, 1986). At the very least, even if the 
other victims never reach the witness stand, they provide the plaintiff's attorney with a 
powerful negotiating tool in trying to reach settlement of the case before trial. 
51. See LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 98. In the Roy trial, Dr. Hartogs testified that 
Ms. Roy had told him she enjoyed telling lies about people and had desires for retalia-
tion and revenge, that she was hostile and distrustful of him because he was a man, and 
that he terminated her therapy because he felt he could not help her. According to Dr. 
Hartogs, Ms. Roy was an incurable catatonic or paranoic schizophrenic who could not 
distinguish between delusion and reality. See J. Roy, supra note 23 at 194-210. This 
testimony was corroborated by the lone psychiatric expert caned by the defendant. [d. at 
232-234. 
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therapist is entitled to discovery on virtually every aspect of her 
psychological history, as well as wide-ranging questions about 
her past sexual behavior. 52 
In addition to denying that the conduct occurred, the thera-
pist may argue that the patient was already psychologically 
damaged and thus was not harmed by her relationship with the 
therapist. 53 For an expert who did not evaluate the patient's 
condition before the illicit relationship, it can be difficult to as-
sess how much of the plaintiff's emotional problems were caused 
by the therapist's conduct, and how much pre-existed the thera-
peutic relationship. This can become the basis for reducing any 
damages awarded to the plaintiff. 54 Likewise, if the therapist is 
uninsured or the insurer denies coverage, the plaintiff may be 
left without an adequate remedy.1I1I 
52. See, e.g., Burnstein, supra note 50 at 56. Once again, the Roy case illustrates. 
During the four years between the filing of her complaint and the trial, in between hospi-
talizations for a debilitating depression, Ms. Roy was subjected to three grueling days of 
depositions, at which she was questioned not only about her sexual relationship with Dr. 
Hartogs, but also about her, sex life outside of therapy and "lesbian" relationship, her 
subsequent therapy and hospitalizations, and her use of the drugs which Dr. Hartogs had 
prescribed for her. The same kinds of questions were repeated at trial. See J. Roy, supra 
note 23 at 125-132. 
The Minnesota statute, see note 48, provides a partial remedy to this problem, stat-
ing that evidence of the plaintiff's sexual history is not admissible in an action for sexual 
exploitation except when the court determines in a pre-trial hearing that the history is 
relevant and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§148A.05 (West 1989). Accord, CAL. CIV, CODE §43.93(d)(West 1989). 
53. See, e.g., Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc.2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup.Ct. 1976); 
Burnstein, supra note 50 at 56. 
54. See, e.g., Roy v. Hartogs, '85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587 (Sup.Ct. 1976). 
Despite Dr. Hartogs' denials, the, jury believed Ms. Roy's version of the story, and 
awarded her $250,000 in compensatory and $100,000 in punitive damages. The trial 
judge reduced the compensatory damages to $50,000, stating that based upon his obser-
vations of Ms. Roy during the trial, he did not believe that she had sustained any perma-
nent emotional damage as a result of Dr. Hartogs' conduct. J. Roy, supra note 23 at 257-
262. Dr. Hartogs appealed the decision and filed for bankruptcy. On appeal, the New 
York Supreme Court further reduced the compensatory damages to $25,000 and elimi-
nated the punitive damages. 85 Misc.2d at 893-894, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 589. They found 
that the compensatory award for aggravation of Ms. Roy's mental disorders was exces-
sive because there was no evidence that Dr. Hartogs' conduct had caused a permanent 
worsening of her condition or a permanent impairment of her inability to work. Id. 
Moreover, they found that the weight of the evidence did not support a finding that Dr. 
Hartogs' conduct was so wanton or reckless as to permit an award for punitive damages. 
Id. However, in negotiations during the pendency of Dr. Hartogs' appeal, his insurance 
company had agreed to pay the $50,000 compensatory damages. J. Roy, supra note 23 at 
263. See, Hartogs u. Employers Mutual Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 89 Misc. 2d 468, 
391 N.Y.S. 2d 962 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
55. In response to the burgeoning cases, the major malpractice insurers have at-
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As the Roy case illustrates, a civil action based upon thera-
pist-patient sexual exploitation requires great fortitude on the 
part of both the client and attorney. At the initial consultation, 
it is incumbent upon the interviewing attorney to advise a pro-
spective client about the nature of the process, and to encourage 
an honest and thorough examination of the facts before any de-
cision is made to proceed with litigation. In most cases, it is 
helpful to get the client's permission to discuss the issues with 
any present treating therapist, both to see whether that person 
will support the litigation, and to get an honest assessment of 
the client's ability to withstand the rigors of pretrial and trial 
scrutiny. At a minimum, the attorney should gather all relevant 
tempted to eliminate coverage for sexual misconduct from their policies. The American 
Psychological Association insurance policy expressly excludes coverage for sexual activ-
ity. See Stone, supra note 40 at 202. Since May 1, 1985, the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation Plan has excluded coverage for "undue behavior" although the policy will con-
tinue to provide legal defense for psychiatrists accused of such behavior. See Simon, 
Sexual Misconduct of Therapists: A Cause for Civil and Criminal Action, TRIAL 46, 50 
(1985). 
Even prior to initiating these express exemptions, the insurers attempted to deny 
coverage for sexual misconduct by arguing that intentional conduct such as sexual rela-
tions with patients fell outside the scope of "professional services rendered." See Le-
Boeuf, supra note 10 at 106, n. 113. Although this does not prevent potential plaintiffs 
from pursuing or even winning their claims, it may make for a hollow victory if the 
insurer refuses to pay and the therapist is insolvent. [d. at 106, n. 115. 
Courts which have considered this issue have come to inconsistent conclusions. See 
LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 106-108. Most courts seem to agree that, in the absence of an 
express exclusion, if the jury finds that the conduct was negligence or malpractice, the 
conduct falls within the scope of professional services and should be covered. See, e.g., 
Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 756, 761-762 (Mo. 1968)(an insurance company 
which insures psychiatrists "in the exercise of reasonable care in the operation of its 
business" should know "that transference pertains to psychiatry and is important in 
treatment." However, the court limited recovery to the $5,000 maximum for "anyone 
claim or suit", rejecting the plaintiff's argument that she was entitled to recover on three 
separate policies for three separate years.) See also, Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. McCabe, 
556 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1983)(where jury found that defendant was negligent 
in his treatment, it fell within policy language covering professional conduct). The new 
policies with express exclusions have yet to be tested in the reported decisions, but at 
least one court has denied recovery under the new policies. See LeBoeuf, supra note 10 
at 108, citing Sphere Insurance Company v. Rosen, Civ.A.No. 85-2654 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 
1986). 
Under the old policies, most courts require the insurer to defend, but some courts 
have permitted insurers in a subsequent action to seek indemnification from the thera-
pist on the ground that the conduct was intentional. See, e.g., Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. 
McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Hartogs v. Employers Mutual Liability 
Co., 89 Misc. 2d 468, 391 N.Y.S. 2d 962 (Sup.Ct. 1977); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Mitchell, 164 Ga. App. 215, 296 S.E.2d 126 (1982). Moreover, some courts have ruled 
that public policy precludes an insurer's liablity for punitive damages. Aetna Life and 
Cas. Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
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mental health records and request an expert evaluation of the 
former therapist's conduct, the client's injuries, and any other 
factors which may affect the viability of the case. Only upon 
completing this review can the attorney assist the client in mak-
ing an informed decision whether or not to proceed. 
C. THE CONSENT DEFENSE 
One potential defense to therapist exploitation cases merits 
special consideration, because it has a certain common sense ap-
peal which may appear legally justifiable without careful scru-
tiny. This is the "consent" defense, which has two important 
variations.56 At one end of the spectrum, the therapist may ar-
gue that the sex was an integral part of therapy, the patient was 
informed about the risks and voluntarily agreed to the conduct 
-the traditional "informed consent" defense in medical mal-
practice cases. 57 At the other extreme, the therapist might argue 
the sex was independent of the therapeutic relationship, the pa-
tient freely consented to the sexual relationship, and it should 
be treated like any other relationship between two consenting 
56. See Stone, supra note 40 at 202-204. In the Roy case, the dissent, who did not 
believe that the therapist's conduct was malpractice, also raised the possibility that the 
plaintiff's consent to the relationship should bar her lawsuit: 
In the case at bar, although the plaintiff was suffering from a 
number of emotional problems her competency was never 
placed in issue. Is it not fair to infer, therefore, that she was 
capable of giving a knowing and meaningful consent? For al-
most one and a half years while this 'meaningful' relationship 
continued, the plaintiff was not heard to complain. Upon the 
defendant terminating the relationship, this lawsuit evolves. 
Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc.2d 891, 897, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 591 
(Sup.Ct. 1976)(Riccobono, J. dissenting). 
Judge Riccobono went on to say that the action should be barred as one of seduction, 
and that the civil courts were not the appropriate forum for addressing the therapist's 
misconduct. [d., 85 Misc.2d at 897-898, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 591-592. The majority upheld 
the malpractice claim without commenting on the consent issue. [d., 85 Misc.2d at 893, 
381 N.Y.S.2d at 588. 
See also, LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 102-106, which notes that some courts distin-
guish between sex in the guise of therapy and sex which the defendant admits was purely 
for his own gratification. Courts which make this distinction usually hold that consent is 
not an available defense when the sex is done as part of therapy, because the plaintiff 
was consenting to treatment rather than sex. [d. at 102, citing Jacobsen v. Muller, 181 
Ga. App. 382, 386 n. 2, 352 S.E. 2d 604, 608 n. 2 (1986)(Deen, P.J., concurring). However, 
they leave open the possibililty that consent may be a defense to sex which is not a part 
of the therapy. LaBoeuf, supra at 102-106. 
57. See Stone, supra note 40 at 202-203. 
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adults. 58 
The courts have had little trouble finding liability in the 
former situation, reasoning that the patient may have consented 
to "therapy", but this consent does not carryover to conduct 
which most experts agree is not proper therapy. 59 The latter sit-
uation is more problematic. Most courts which have considered 
the issue have viewed it in terms of "capacity" to consent, rea-
soning that a patient who has gone to therapy for treatment of 
emotional or psychological problems is not capable of fully 
granting or withholding consent from her therapist.60 This the-
ory finds support in the clinical literature, which suggests that 
the nature of the therapist patient relationship (in which the 
therapist is always significantly more knowledgeable and power-
ful than the patient)61 makes it clinically impossible for a pa-
tient to give voluntary and informed consent to the sexual rela-
tionship.62 In clinical terms, it is the therapist's rather than the 
patient's duty to avoid the sexual contact.63 
Although the theory that a patient lacks capacity to consent 
to a sexual relationship with her therapist is compatible with 
clinical explanations of the nature of the therapeutic relation-
ship, some feminist commentators fear it advances the stere-
otypical view of women as powerless, dependent, and incapable 
58.Id. 
59. To obtain a valid "informed consent" from a patient for sex under the guise of 
therapy, the therapist would have to disclose both the nature of the treatment and the 
extent of the harm involved. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §892B comment i (1977). 
It would be an unusual case indeed where a therapist informed a patient, prior to com-
mencement of a sexual relationship, that this "tre'atment" might cause the devastating 
consequences discussed in Section I of the text. 
LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 102-106, argues that the "under guise of treatment" dis-
tinction is an arbitrary one which does not take into account the fact that there would be 
no sexual relationship if there were no therapeutic relationship. Id. at 103. Obtaining 
sexual acquiescence by presenting the sex as therapy is only one form of coercion prac-
ticed by exploitive therapists. Id. at 105-106. LeBoeuf argues that it serves no legally 
justifiable purpose to permit recovery when the therapist represents the sex as part of 
treatment, but to deny recovery under other circumstnces. Id. 
60. See LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 100-102, and cases cited. See a/so, RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §892A(2) comment b (1977). "If, however, the one who consents is 
not capable of appreciating the nature, extent or probably consequences of the conduct, 
the consent is not effective ... ". Id. 
61. See, Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 23-24, 124. 
62. See LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 100-102. See also Pope, supra note 2 at 122, 132. 
63. See Pope, supra note 2 at 124. 
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of making their own decisions.6• Further, in some jurisdictions, 
lack of capacity to consent is difficult to prove, requiring that 
the plaintiff be unable to manage her affairs or comprehend .her 
legal rights and liabilities.611 If a plaintiff has been able to con-
tinue working and has not been otherwise incapacitated, the 
court may be skeptical about an argument that she lacked ca-
pacity for the specific purpose of consenting to a sexual relation-
ship with her therapist.66 
D. A QUESTION OF DUTY 
In any event, if the cause of action against the therapist is 
framed as malpractice rather than an intentional tort, the "con-
sent" defense is inappropriate.67 The underlying issue of real 
concern in such cases is a "duty" question; i.e., does a therapist 
have a duty to refrain from sexual relations with a patient - even 
64. See LeBoeuf, supra note 9 at 101-102. 
65. See, 51 AM.JUR.2D, Limitation of Actions §187 and cases cited. Compare, RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ([892(A)(2)(a)comment b (not capable of appreciating the 
nature, extent or probable consequences of the conduct). See,' e.g., Decker v. Fink, 47 
Md. App. 202, 422 A. 2d 389, 392 (1980). 
66. The other legal theories for countering a consent defense, i.e., fraud and duress, 
have' similar limitations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §892B (1977). If a plain-
tiff is induced by fraud, mistake or duress to consent to a harmful or offensive contact, 
the consent is not effective. Thus, where the therapist represented to the patient that the 
sexual contact would be beneficial, and the patient relied on that representation in con-
senting to the sexual relationship, the consent may be ineffective. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §892B comment h (1977). Likewise, if the plaintiff is compelled to con-
sent by the exercise of the therapist's will, her consent will be ineffective. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §892B comment j (1977). However, the forms of duress which courts 
have generally required to render consent ineffective "are quite drastic in their nature 
and •.. clearly and immediately amount to an overpowering of the will," as in force or 
threats of force. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §892B comment j (1977). Although a 
clinical argument can be made that the nature of the therapeutic relationship renders 
these defenses applicable, the usual sexual exploitation case does not fit the strict stan-
dards traditionally applied by courts in evaluating claims of fraud and duress. 
67. See, Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 132. Under basic principles of black 
letter law, consent is a defense only to intentional torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §49 (1964). The analogous principle in negligence actions is "assumption of the 
risk." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §892A comment a (1977). Assumption of the risk 
requires that the plaintiff must fully understand the particular risk of harm which may 
be caused by the defendant's conduct, and must appreciate its unreasonable character. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §496C 496D (1964). These conditions clearly do not 
apply in the usual sexual exploitation case, where the patient is unaware of the nature 
and extent of the risk of injury. In fact, this standard is loosely comparable to the "in-
formed consent" to treatment standard, which the courts have had no trouble rejecting 
in these circumstances. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. . 
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outside of the therapeutic setting or after the termination of the 
formal therapist-patient relationship? 
With regard to sexual relationships which take place during 
the course of treatment (even if the actual sex takes place 
outside of the therapy sessions), the clinical commentators are in 
agreement that such sexual contact cannot be separated from 
the therapeutic relationship and that any sexual contact there-
fore constitutes malpractice.68 With regard to post-termination 
sex, there is widespread disagreement among clinicians whether, 
and under what circumstances, a sexual relationship may be 
permissible.69 
Some therapists believe that such a relationship may be 
permissible with the passage of time, especially if it is to pursue 
a "serious, commited" relationship which leads to love and mar-
riage. 70 Other commentators scoff at the idea of such distinc-
tions, taking the position that the prohibition against sexual 
contact is permanently established with the initial encounter 
and cannot be abrogated by termination.7 ! Numerous authors 
68. In recognition of these clinical standards, the Minnesota and California statutes 
specifically provide that it is not a defense to the action that sexual contact occurred 
outside a therapy or treatment session or off the premises regularly used by the therapist 
for therapy or treatment sessions. MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.02(2)(West 1989); CAL. CIY. 
CODE §43.93(cHWest 1989). See also, Simon, supra note 55 at 49 (citing two unreported 
decisions which rejected the argument that therapy had been terminated before the sex-
ual relationship began). 
69. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 13 at 167; Schoener, Some Observations on Sex-
ual Relationships Between Client and Therapist After Therapy Ends, Presented at the 
Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C. (Au-
gust 24, 1986)[hereinafter cited as Schoener). Schoener points out that the professional 
codes of ethics are essentially silent on the question of post-therapy sex, and conceptual 
articles and research are virtually non-existent. Id. at 2. 
70. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 13 at 168 (discussing the views of Perr and 
Marmor). The apparent rationale for their view is that therapists are only human, and 
sometimes cannot master their own counter-transference feelings. Id. Perr and Marmor 
would require the therapist who finds himself in this situation to terminate the profes-
sional relationship and refer the patient elsewhere for treatment. Id. See also, Trends in 
Ethics Cases, supra note 8 at 567-569; Schoener, supra note 69 at 2. 
71. See Herman, supra note 13 at 168 (discussing the views of Anderson and Brod-
sky); Trends in Ethics Cases, supra note 8 at 568. Herman adopts this view in unequivo-
cal terms: 
Neither transference nor the real inequality in the power rela-
tionship ends with the termination of therapy. In our opinion, 
the notion that exceptions to the rule of abstinence can be al-
lowed in the name of love or marriage reveals either a naive 
romanticism or an insufficient understanding of the nature of 
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compare the prohibition against sexual contact with patients to 
the incest taboo. Just as sexual contact with a child "does not 
become acceptable one year after the daughter has left home", 
these commentators believe that sex with a former patient does 
not become acceptable at some magic time after the formal ther-
apeutic relationship has ended.72 
Because of the widespread disagreement among clinicians, it 
is impossible to articulate a bright-line test for evaluating when 
the therapist's duty to a former patient ends. As in any malprac-
tice action, expert testimony will be required on the issue, and 
the trial may turn into a "battle of the experts". The clinical 
literature, however, does suggest some relevant considerations in 
determining when a therapist's sexual conduct with a former pa-
tient breaches his professional duty. These ,considerations re-
volve around the nature of the particular therapeutic relation-
ship, as well as the circumstances surrounding the termination 
of therapy and the beginning of the sexual relationship.73 
Minnesota, which enacted one of the first statutes creating a 
civil cause of action for therapist-patient sexual exploitation, at-
tempted to resolve this ambiguity by defining both a time limit 
the therapeutic relationship or both. Similarly, pragmatic ef-
forts to define a post-termintion waiting period, after which 
sexual relations might be permissible, disregards both the con-
tinued inequality of the roles of the therapist and former pa-
tient and the timelessness of unconscious processes, including 
transference. Herman, supra note 13 at 168. 
72. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 13 at 1168: "This analogy accurately describes 
both the psychodynamics and the reality of the power relationship." See also Kardener, 
Sex and the Physician-Patient Relationship, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1134, 1135 (1974). 
73. See Schoener, supra note 69 at 5-8. As Schoener points out, even the initial 
determination of when the therapy actually ended is a difficult one. "Was a followup 
phone call 6 months later a psychotherapeutic interaction? Was that brief, impromptu 
followup consultation in private during a chance social meeting a continuation of the 
psychotherapy relationship?" [d. at 5. 
Schoener suggests that the following factors are relevant in evaluating whether post-
termination sex is clinically appropriate: 1) Was there "therapeutic deception"; e.g. did 
the therapist tell the patient that the sex was part of treatment or otherwise appropri-
ate? (2) Was there a real termination: e.g. was the end of therapy discussed, was there a 
break in emotional involvement, or was the termination for the purpose of allowing a 
sexual or romantic involvement? (3) Did the therapist and patient obtain outside consul-
tation (preferably as a couple) to determine whether the sexual relationship was an im-
proper continuation of the therapeutic relationship? (4) Who initiated the sexual rela-
tionship? (5) What was the length and level of therapeutic involvement (and the 
concomitant power inequity)? (6) What were the particular emotional vulnerabilities of 
the client? [d. at 7-8. 
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and the circumstances which would make a psychotherapists's 
sexual contact with a former patient actionable.74 If the sexual 
contact begins within two years after the termination of therapy, 
the statute provides a cause of action if the former patient was 
"emotionally dependent" on the therapist or the sexual contact 
occurred by means of "therapeutic deception".711 
Both of the operative conditions are defined in terms of the 
therapist's knowledge and intentions. A former patient is consid-
ered to be "emotionally dependent" if the therapist knows or 
has reason to believe (based upon the nature of the relationship) 
that she is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact.76 Like-
wise, "therapeutic deception" comes into play if the therapist 
makes a representation that sexual contact is consistent with or 
part of the former patient's treatment.77 These considerations 
may be appropriate, but they fail to take into account the pa-
tient's subjective perceptions and the more subtle kinds of pres-
sure which may be brought to bear simply by the inequality of 
the relationship. Moreover, they appear to minimize the ther-
epist's duty to use his superior clinical knowledge to protect for-
mer patients from relationships which they may not be emotion-
ally prepared to handle. 
The Minnesota statute is a good starting point in providing 
protection to victims of psychiatric sexual exploitation, but it 
seems unfair to place the burden of proving the therapist's 
knowledge and intentions on the plaintiff, who has no way of 
proving them other than the therapist's own testimony. One al-
ternative approach would be to adopt a subjective standard 
based upon the patient's perceptions of the relationship. Under 
this standard, the plaintiff could testify as to her own feelings of 
dependency rather than trying to establish what the therapist 
knew about her feelings of dependency. This testimony could be 
buttressed by expert testimony of "emotional dependency" 
based upon clinical observations of the plaintiff's condition. 
74. MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.02(1) and (2)(West 1989). 
75. MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.01(3)(West 1989) ("Former patient" means a person 
who was given psychotherapy within two years prior to sexual contact with the psycho-
therapist); §148A.02(2) (a cause of action exists for "former patients" if they were "emo-
tionally dependent" upon the psychotherapist or the sexual contact occurred by means 
of "therapeutic deception"). 
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.01(2)(West 1989). 
77. MINN. STAT. ANN., §148A.01 (8)(West 1989). 
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It is possible to envision a standard where capacity to con-
sent does not even come into play. If the patient testifies she 
was emotionally dependent upon the therapist, and if expert tes-
timony establishes the transference phenomenon or the power 
imbalance was still operating, the burden would shift to the 
therapist to establish he did not know (and did not have reason 
to know) that his sexual conduct exploited the patient's trust. 
III. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
As was discussed in Section I, supra, the psychological dy-
namics of the patient-therapist relationship often make it im-
possible for the patient to face the implications of her relation-
ship with the therapist until many years after the conduct has 
occurred.78 It is not uncommon for a patient to delay several 
years before she seeks legal redress for her injuries, thus giving 
rise to a statute of limitations defense.79 
Historically, laws limiting actions are the creation of stat-
utes; without these statutory restrictions, an injured person 
would face no time restrictions in seeking redress for an injury.8o 
Statutes of limitations are designed to protect potential defend-
ants from perpetual liability, and to avoid the dangers of "stale" 
claims where evidence has been lost and witnesses' memories 
have faded. In interpreting the statutes, courts have to balance 
these policies with the legitimate interests of injuried parties in 
seeking redress for their grievances.81 A number of equitable ex-
ceptions to the statute of limitations have beEm established by 
the courts to protect the interests of potential plaintiffs who, for 
good reason, have been inhibited from prompt legal action.82 Al-
though these exceptions may be sufficient to protect victims of 
sexual exploitation in certain circumstances, they are subject to 
78. See Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 130. 
79.Id. 
80. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions §135 (1970); Saiten, Statutes of Limi-
tations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 
189, 206-208 (1984)[hereinafter cited as Saiten]. Although the time periods imposed by 
statutes of limitations vary considerably from state to state, there are a number of prin-
ciples of interpretation which have gained widespread acceptance across the jurisdic-
tions. These principles will be discussed in general terms in this article; however, refer-
ence to the laws of a particular state are essential to analyze any particular case. 
81. See Salten, supra note 80 at 206-208. 
82. Id. at 207. 
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vagaries of interpretation which may leave many victims without 
a remedy. 
A. THE DISCOVERY RULE 
In personal injury actions, the time period during which a 
plaintiff is permitted access to the courts is generally measured 
from the date when the cause of action "accrues" or "arises",. 
Historically, this date has been measured from the time the neg-
ligent act occurs and some injury is sustained, regardless of 
whether or not substantial damages have occurred.s3 To ease the 
harshness of this rule, a growing number of jurisdictions have 
adopted a "discovery" rule, which provides that the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until a prospective plaintiff 
learns or reasonably should have learned the defendant's con-
duct has caused her harm.s• 
Most courts which have adopted a discovery rule seem to 
view it as a limited exception.S& In most jurisdictions it is not 
sufficient for the plaintiff to claim she did not know the legal 
basis for her claim, or that she was not aware of the extent of 
her injuries.86 What sets the statute of limitations running is 
knowledge of the fact that she was injured, and in some jurisdic-
tions, knowledge of their causal connection with the defendant's 
conduct.87 
The question of when a victim of therapeutic sexual ex-
ploitation became aware of her injuries and their cause is a com-
plex one. Most patients are already in emotional or psychologi-
cal distress when they seek therapy. They may not immediately 
perceive that their emotional health is deteriorating. Even if 
they are aware that they are feeling worse, they may not link the 
deterioration to the therapist, especially during the pendency of 
the sexual relationship. Because of the psychological mecha-
83. See, 61 AM. JuR. 2D. Physicians, Surgeons & Other Healers §319 (1981); 51 AM. 
JUR. 2D. Limitation of Actions §135-136 (1970); Salten, supra note 80 at 207. 
84. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D. Physicians, Surgeons & Other Healers §321 (1981); Salten, 
supra note 80 at 213-219. 
85. See Salten, supra note 80 at 213, n. 143. 
86. See, 61 AM,JUR.2D. Physicians, Surgeons & Other Healers, §321, n. 78, 81 (1988 
Supp.). 
87. See Salten, supra note 80 at 213, n. 142; and note 93, infra. 
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nisms of repression and denial, a victim may be intellectually 
aware of her injuries without being psychologically able to un-
derstand their implications or to act on that knowledge. Despite 
these difficulties, most courts which have analyzed the statute of 
limitations issue in sexual exploitation cases have attempted to 
fit it into the discovery rule framework.88 
A ground breaking Pennsylvania case, in which a jury 
awarded the plaintiff $665,000 for her therapist's negligence in 
improperly administering drugs and engaging in a sexual rela-
tionship with her, illustrates.89 The plaintiff, Gale Greenberg, 
had sought treatment from the defendant, Donald McCabe, in 
June 1986 when she was suffering from a neurotic condition di-
agnosed as the "harried housewife syndrome".9o Dr. McCabe 
told her at the initial visit that she had a lot of sexual hang-ups, 
and initiated an ongoing sexual relationship with· her within six 
months of the beginning of therapy.91 As a part of the therapy, 
he also administered drugs to the plaintiff which she claimed 
caused permanent psychosis and organic brain damage.92 
The therapeutic relationship lasted from June 1968 through 
February 1974, and suit was filed on January 5, 1976. There was 
no dispute that Pennsylvania's two year statute of limitations 
applied; however, the defendant argued it had begun to run long 
before the termination of the therapeutic relationship. The dis-
trict court, ruling on a motion for directed verdict, concluded 
that there was a legitimate issue of fact for the jury as to 
whether the plaintiff had filed her claim within the statute of 
limitations.93 
88. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F. 2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986); Decker v. 
Fink, 47 Md. App. 202, 422 A. 2d 389 (1980); Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765 
(E.D. Pa. 1978), affirmed 594 F. 2d 854 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 840; Sey-
mour v. Lofgreen, 209 Kan. 72, 495 P.2d 969 (1972). 
89. Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affirmed 594 F.2d 854 
(3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 840. 
90. [d. at 770. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. at 770. In making its decision, the court clarified the standard to be applied 
to discovery rule cases under Pennsylvania law. First, it rejected defendant's argument 
that knowledge of the injury. alone is sufficient to start the statute running, ruling that 
the limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows or reasonably 
should know the cause of the injury. [d. at 767. Second, although mental disability does 
not toll the statute of limitations under Pennsylvania law, the court ruled that the plain-
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The court's analysis began by acknowledging that the plain-
tiff knew she was suffering from mental illness of some sort prior 
to the relevant cut-off date, but held that was not dispositive of 
the issue, since she had some mild neurosis when she first went 
to the defendant.94 The dispositive issue was "whether plaintiff 
as a matter of law knew or should have known ... of deteriora-
tion in her mental condition that was caused by the defendant's 
conduct, in light of all the circumstances (including the mental 
state she was in as a result of Dr. McCabe's conduct}."911 Even 
under this generous interpretation of the discovery rule, the 
court had to engage in some elaborate analysis to uphold the 
jury's verdict. 
At trial, the plaintiff testified that Dr. McCabe told her in 
1968 that it was "wrong" for them to have a sexual relationship, 
a fact which defendant claimed put her on constructive notice of 
his improper treatment. The court rejected that argument, rea-
soning that the jury might have concluded the defendant's state-
ment reflected a moral judgment rather than his opinion that it 
was improper psychiatric care. Further, this statement was con-
tradicted by the defendant's statements that the relationship 
would aid Mrs. McCabe in her therapy. Thus it was reasonable 
for the plaintiff not to infer the treatment was damaging to 
her.96 Even if she was aware that the treatment was medically 
improper, the jury could have found that she had no reason to 
know of the causal connection between the malpractice and her 
condition, since she was already very ill when she started 
tiff's mental condition "is among the many factors which can be weighed by the fact-
finder in determining the time of discovery, insofar as that condition was caused by the 
defendant." [d. at 768. 
The court emphasized the "narrowness" of its ruling on this issue, pointing out in 
dicta that "[ilt does not mean that a plaintiff may offer slow-wittedness, idiosyncratic 
weaknesses of reasoning or lack of legal sophistication to excuse a failure to discover. 
Thus we do not mean to suggest that a defendant can be deprived of the important 
protections provided by the statute of limitations [citations omitted], because he or she 
has the misfortune to harm a plaintiff who is not mentally capable of bringing the action 
within the statutory period. Rather, we mean to say that the statutory period does not 
begin to run if the fact-finder concludes that the plaintiff's failure of discovery, objec-
tively determined, is brought about by the very nature of the defendant's conduct." [d. 
at 769. The court also suggested alternative conceptual approaches, such as "estoppel", 
which might be used to justify its decision. [d. at 769. 
94. [d. at 770. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. at 770. 
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treatment.97 
Plaintiff was also advised by two psychiatrists at a drug de-
toxification program, to which she was admitted in 1972, that 
her sexual relationship with Dr. McCabe was wrong.99 The de-
fendant argued that the severity of her injuries when she was 
hospitalized and the advice from two outside psychiatrists 
should have started the statute of limitations running at least as 
early as 1972.99 Again, the court found that a jury was not com-
pelled to conclude she had reason to discover the causal connec-
tion in the absence of evidence that either of these doctors ad-
vised her that the defendant's therapy was psychiatrically 
improper or had damaged her.loo 
The court considered three factors to be of special signifi-
cance in its analysis. First, the plaintiff's impaired mental condi-
tion and extreme dependence, which resulted from the defend-
ant's mishandling of the transference phenomenon, supported a 
jury inference "that she neither knew nor by objective standards 
could have known under those circumstances that the defend-
ant's treatment of her was related to her psychological damages 
before 1974."101 Second, the defendant's reassurances that the 
sexual relationship and the drugs he was administering were 
proper therapy were relevant in determining what a reasonable 
plaintiff would have done. l02 Finally, the continuing therapist-
patient relationship during the time period when the defendant 
claimed the plaintiff should have known his improper treatment 
was causing her harm "could be taken into consideration in de-
termining what investigation of the defendant's conduct the rea-
sonably diligent plaintiff would have made and what knowledge 
the reasonably diligent plaintiff would have had. "103 
In Simmons v. United States,I°4 a federal court of appeals 
relied upon the reasoning of Greenberg to uphold the district 
court's finding that the plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue 
97.Id. 
98. Id. at 770-771. 
99. Id. at 771. 
100. Id. at 771. 
101. Id. at 771-772. 
102. Id. at 772. 
103. Id. 
104. Simmons v. United States, 805 F. 2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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until she was advised by her subsequent treating psychiatrist 
that the defendant's improper handling of the transference phe-
nomenon had caused the emotional and psychological damage 
she suffered. lOG Plaintiff's experts had testified that she was suf-
fering from post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the unethi-
cal conduct of the defendant, and she had no idea her emotional 
condition had been caused by that conduct until advised by her 
subsequent psychiatrist. Until then, she had believed that what 
had occurred had happened because she was "a very bad person, 
a worthless person, a guilty person", all of which caused her 
great guilt and shame.loe The court pointed out that transfer-
ence, dependence, and the psychiatrist's assurance that the con-
duct is good for them, makes it very difficult for patients to be-
lieve the therapist caused their emotional damage; instead they 
blame themselves. l07 A delay in filing a legal claim may not be 
"unreasonable" under these circumstances. 
Although one might applaud the analyses and the results of 
the Greenberg and Simmons cases, the discovery rule has seri-
ous limiations in evaluating whether a victim's claim against her 
therapist for sexual exploitation is timely filed. First, in jurisdic-
tions with more restrictive interpretations of the rule (i.e. where 
only knowledge of the injury and not causation is required), 
plaintiffs may be unfairly barred from pursuing their claims. lOS 
Secondly, both courts and juries may reach different conclusions 
where all of the "significant" legal factors in McCabe are not 
present. Finally, even a generous interpretation of the discovery 
rule may not adequately protect the interests of patients who 
105. [d. at 1366, 1367 ("Ms. Simmons did not know Mr. Kammers' conduct caused 
her emotional injury until another 'doctor so informed her in February 1983. It was not 
knowledge of his legal fault that she gained in 1983, but knowledge of the fact that his 
mishandling of her normal transference had caused her psychological damage.") [d. at 
1367. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. at 1368. 
108. See, e.g., Seymour v. Lofgreen, 209 Kan. 72, 495 P. 2d 969 (1972). Under the 
Kansas discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the "fact of injury 
becomes readily ascertainable." [d., 209 Kan. at 77, 495 P.2d at 973. Plaintiff tried to 
avoid the harsh effects of this rule by claiming that her mental illness made her unable 
to ascertain the fact of her injury, but the court ruled that she was barred from making 
that argument because she did not assert "legal incapacity" as a cause for her delay. [d. 
Moreover, if she had alleged a legal disability, her action would have been barred by the 
one year tolling statute applicable to actions brought upon removal of a disability. [d., 
209 Kan. at 78, 495 P.2d at 974. 
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are advised by another professional that their sexual relation-
ship is inappropriate and harmful, but who are unable to appre-
ciate or act on that advice because of their dependency and con-
tinuing relationship with the offending therapist. 
By way of illustration, consider the case of Marcia Decker, 
who claimed her therapist, Gerald Fink, improperly manipulated 
the analysis to engage in sexual relations with her during each 
and every visit to his office from 1971 until the end of the sum-
mer of 1975.109 Ms. Decker filed suit against Dr. Fink in March, 
1977, well within the applicable three-year statute of limitations 
if the period did not begin to run until the termination of their 
relationship. Under Maryland law, however, the "continuous 
treatment" rule is subsumed by the discovery rule; i.e., if the 
patient learns or reasonably should have learned of her injury 
during the course of treatment, the statute of limitations begins 
to run from the time of actual or constructive knowledge. llo 
The trial judge, ruling on a motion for directed verdict at 
the close of plaintiff's evidence, found that Ms. Decker should 
have known of the alleged malpractice in May of 1973, when she 
consulted another psychiatrist who told her the sexual relation-
ship was inappropriate and not beneficial treatment, and she 
should terminate the relationship.lll The consulting therapist 
had testified Ms. Decker was capable of understanding his ad-
vice; however, she testified she was in a state of confusion and 
anxiety caused by her emotional and psychological dependence 
on Dr. Fink during this period of time. ll2 
109. Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202, 422 A. 2d 389 (1980). There was testimony 
that the regular treatment was terminated at the end of 1971, but the sexual relationship 
continued during plaintiff's regular visits to the same office where therapy had taken 
place. The court did not make any distinction between the formal therapy and the con-
tinuing sexual relationship in its analysis. Id., 47 Md.App. at 205, 422 A.2d at 391. 
110. Id., 47 Md.App. at 393, 422 A.2d at 210. 
111. Id., 47 Md.App. at 394, 422 A.2d at 212. A subsequent Maryland case has called 
into question the standard of review applied by the court in deciding the Fink case. 
O'Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 295-297, 503 A. 2d 1313, 1320-1321 (1986). In upholding 
the trial judge's grant of a directed verdict to the defendant, the Court of Special Ap-
peals had applied a clearly erroneous standard to the fact-finding made by the trial judge 
rather than by resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the plaintiff. Id. The 
substantive legal standards applied in the Fink case, however, were not challenged by 
the subsequent decision and are still valid Marlyand law. 
112. Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202, 205, 422 A.2d 389, 391 (1980). 
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In the Fink opinion, there was no analysis of the pressure 
exerted by the plaintiff's continuing relationship with her thera-
pist, and its possible effects on her ability to psychologically un-
derstand or act upon the consulting therapist's advice. The 
court's interpretation of the discovery rule rendered Dr. Fink's 
continuing misconduct, which might be viewed as a reason' to 
estop him from asserting a statute of limitations defense during 
the time the sexual relationship continued, legally irrelevant. 
In Greenberg, the court pointed out that the statute of limi-
tations was particularly inappropriate for a determination as a 
matter of law in sexual exploitation cases, "where the central 
factual inquiries concern the reasonableness of plaintiff's igno-
rance and of her diligence under all the circumstances, and 
where the injury and cause thereof are subtler and more compli-
cated than in the normal malpractice case."IlS This author sub-
113. Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affirmed 594 F.2d 
854 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 840. The factors which led to a favorable result 
in the Greenberg case were not based upon pure "discovery rule" considerations. The 
court's analysis incorporated three distinct exceptions to the general statute of limita-
tions rule: incapacity or diminished capacity, the continuous treatment rule, and estop-
pel based on fraudulent concealment. As a comparison of the Greenberg and Fink cases 
will illustrate, these exceptions are not applied uniformly by courts in different jurisdic-
tions, and cannot be depended upon to protect victims of psychiatric sexual exploitation. 
In the Fink case, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that her "impaired judg-
ment" (caused by her emotional and psychological dependence on the defendant) should 
toll the statute. 47 Md.App. at 209,422 A.2d at 392. One of the psychiatrists who treated 
plaintiff in 1973 testified that "she was not psychotic, not hallucinating, but could make 
decisions". [d., 47 Md.App. at 208-209, 422 A.2d at 393. Based upon that testimony, the 
court found that the evidence did not support a claim of "impaired judgment". By con-
trast, in Greenberg, the court considered the plaintiff's impaired mental condition and 
extreme dependence upon the defendant to be an important factor in its discovery rule 
decision. 453 F. Supp. at 772. 
Likewise, in Greenberg, despite the fact that Pennsylvania does not have a "continu-
ous treatment rule" tolling the statute of limitations until the end of treatment by the 
defendant, the court considered the ongoing therapeutic relationship to be an important 
factor in determining the reasonableness of the plaintiff's state of knowledge. 453 F. 
Supp. at 772. By contrast, in Fink, the court held that once the plaintiff had been ad-
vised of the impropriety of the defendant's conduct, there was no legal excuse for her 
failure to file an action against him, notwithstanding their continued relationship. 47 
Md.App. at 212, 422 A.2d at 393-395. 
Finally, in Greenberg, the court considered the therapist's reassurances that the sex-
ual relationship and the drugs he was administering were proper therapy to be signifi-
cant in determining the reasonableness of plaintiff's efforts to discover her injury. 453 F. 
Supp. at 772. By contrast, in Fink the court summarily dismissed the possibility that its 
statutory exception where a party is kept in ignorance of a cause of action by the fraud 
of an adverse party might be applicable. 47 Md.App. at 209, 422 A.2d at 393. 
A therapist's reassurances could arguably form the basis for a claim of "fraudulent 
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mits that the same factors make it extremely difficult to evalu-
ate these cases in terms of traditional "discovery rule" analysis. 
Victims of psychiatric sexual exploitation would be better pro-
tected by a statute of limitations which incorporates the relevant 
clinical considerations (such as dependency, transference and 
the power imbalance inherent in the therapeutic relationship) 
unique to this particular class of plaintiffs. 
B. A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REMEDY 
The states which have created statutory rights of action for 
psychiatric sexual exploitation have not adequately addressed 
the statute of limitations problem.1l4 The most liberal approach 
is in Minnesota, where the usual two year statute for medical 
malpractice cases was enlarged to five years "after the cause of 
action arises" for sexual exploitation cases.ll6 This five year rule 
may be expected to protect a number of potential plaintiffs, but 
it incorporates all the limitations of the discovery rule discussed 
in Section IliA, supra, and therefore does not provide adequate 
protection. Instead, a standard should be set which incorporates 
the relevant legal and clinical factors and offers all victims a rea~ 
sonable opportunity to pursue their claims. 
At a minimum, this writer recommends that the statute of 
limitations should not begin to run until after the patient's rela-
tionship with the therapist has ended. Given the power imbal-
ance, patients should not be expected to psychologically appreci-
ate or act upon the therapist's inappropriate conduct during the 
concealment" which, in some jurisdictions, tolls the statute of limitations until the plain-
tiff learns or should have learned of facts sufficient to give knowledge of the conceal-
ment. See, e.g., 61 AM. JUR. 2D, Physicians, Surgeons & Other Healers, §322 (1981); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, §12 (West 1959); Flotech, Inc. v. Dupont, 814 F.2d 775 
(1st Cir. 1987). Obviously, victims of psychiatric sexual abuse have knowledge of the 
underlying facts (e.g. that the sexual conduct has occurred), but often do not have 
knowledge that this conduct was harmful to them until many years later. Arguably, they 
do not have knowledge of their therapists' "concealment" of the wrong until such time as 
they are able to understand the causal connection between the therapist's breach of duty 
and their injuries. Moreover, there is no question that during the course of the therapeu-
tic relationship, a therapist has a fiduciary duty to disclose that a sexual relationship 
may be harmful to his patients. Many experts in this field agree that this fiduciary duty 
continues indefinitely even after the formal therapeutic relationship has ended. See 
supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
114. See note 48, supra. 
115. MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.06 (West 1989). 
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ongoing relationship, even if they are advised of its dangers. 
Once the relationship has ended, plaintiffs should be given a 
reasonable number of years within which to bring their claims. 
During this period, the statute should be stayed until the pa-
tient has received an "informed diagnosis," i.e., has been advised 
by a subsequent therapist of the impropriety and the harm 
which it caused. If the subsequent therapist (or expert testi-
mony) establishes the patient was psychologically incapable of 
understanding or acting upon the informed diagnosis, the stat-
ute should be stayed until the patient reaches the necessary 
level of understanding. 
Opponents may argue that this rule would subject ther-
apists to perpetual liability for their sexual offenses. Indeed, in 
cases where the psychological damage is severe, the patient may 
be hospitalized, resist further treatment, or be unable to under-
stand the therapist's role in causing her injuries for a substantial 
period of time. In setting policies and standards for the limita-
tion of actions, legislatures have to balance potential 
defendants' needs for finality with potential plaintiffs' legitimate 
interests in seeking redress for their grievances. When the po-
tential defendant has created the very conditions which cause 
the plaintiff to delay in filing her claim, the balance should 
weigh in favor of the plaintiff. In this writer's view, the proposed 
standard would place the responsibility for the victim's delay 
where it belongs - on the offending therapist who misled her, 
betrayed her trust, and rendered her unable to understand the 
implications of his actions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Therapist-patient sexual exploitation is a significant social 
problem. The consequences to victims, who are primarily 
women, are devastating. Civil litigation is the only avenue of re-
dress which can provide monetary damages to compensate vic-
tims for their injuries, and to pay the expenses of future treat-
ment. Successful civil actions are difficult, despite the fact that 
most courts which have viewed the problem consider therapist's 
sexual relationships with patients to be malpractice. There is 
often a statute of limitations problem, because the nature of the 
therapeutic relationship makes it difficult for patients to recog-
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nize that their therapists have injured them. If the case is per-
mitted to progress, it is common for the therapist to deny that 
there was a sexual relationship, or, alternatively, to claim that it 
was a mutual relationship between two consenting adults. 
In either case, plaintiffs face problems of proof. Since there 
are seldom any witnesses, it is difficult to prove that the conduct 
occurred. Likewise, unless force was used, it is hard for the 
plaintiff to deny that she consented to the sex. Plaintiffs often 
feel re-victimized by the litigation process, which usually in-
volves probing questions about their sexual and psychological 
histories. Civil "rape-shield" laws, like the one enacted in Min-
nesota, can help to protect plaintiffs from inappropriate ques-
tioning about their private sex lives. 
The courts sometimes have difficulty in applying traditional 
common law theories to sexual exploitation cases. Since the con-
duct does have intentional aspects, some courts consider "con-
sent" to be a possible defense, even if the case is characterized 
as a simple negligence or malpractice claim. This article con-
tends that the consent defense is inappropriate unless the plain-
tiff proceeds on an intentional tort theory. Further, for clinical 
reasons, it is virtually impossible for a plaintiff to give truly "in-
formed consent" to her therapist's sexual advances. 
The underlying issue of real concern in these cases is the 
extent of a therapist's duty to a patient outside of the confines 
of the therapy setting, or to a former patient whose therapy has 
been terminated. For the most part, clinicians and courts are in 
agreement that a therapist has a duty to refrain from sexual re-
lations with a present patient, even if the sex takes place outside 
of the therapeutic setting. Former patients pose more of a di-
lemma. Some clinicians believe that sex with a former patient 
may be appropriate after a period of time, especially if it is to 
pursue a serious relationship. Others believe that a therapist's 
duty to refrain from sex with a former patient can never be 
abrogated. 
Until the clinicians reach some consensus on this issue, a 
therapist's duty to his former patient will have to be determined 
on a case by case basis by the trier of fact. If a plaintiff presents 
evidence that dependency, transference or the power imbalance 
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was still operating when the sex took place, this author recom-
mends that the burden should shift to the therapist to establish 
that he did not know (or have reason to know) that his sexual 
conduct exploited the patient's trust. 
Courts also have trouble with the statute of limitations issue 
in sexual exploitation cases. Most courts try to fit the facts into 
the typical discovery rule analysis, which requires only that the 
plaintiff be on notice of the fact that she was injured and, in 
some jurisdiction, their causal relationship to the defendant's 
conduct. This standard does not adequately take into account 
the psychological mechanisms of transference, dependency and 
the power imbalance between therapist and patient. Because of 
these psychological factors, a potential plaintiff may be unable 
to understand the harmfulness of an ongoing relationship with 
her therapist, even in the face of explicit advice from another 
professional. This article recommends legislation which would 
stay the statute of limitations until after the potential plaintiff's 
relationship with her therapist has ended, and she has received 
an informed diagnosis from a subsequent therapist. Since the 
therapist's misuse of the therapeutic process is responsible for 
the plaintiff's delay in filing, he should be estopped from using 
that delay as a defense to liability. 
As two of the pioneer clinicians and researchers in this field 
have pointed out, filing a complaint 
can be an important, positive, and healing experi-
ence for patients who have been sexually involved 
with their therapists. It can be a constructive as-
sertion of one's rights, helping to counteract feel-
ings of passive victimization .... It can be means 
by which a consumer holds accountable the pro-
fessional for his or her violation of professional 
standards .... It can be an act of courage and 
self-affirmation, a refusal to be intimidated into 
paralysis by the explicit and implicit threats of 
the exploitive therapists. lJO 
Legislative reform is the most effective means to ensure that our 
legal system takes into account the special clinical and legal con-' 
siderations presented by these cases. 
116. Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 110. 
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